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ABSTRACT 
  
U.S. NATION-STATE BUILDING OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN:  
A CASE STUDY 
 
Anthony Daniel Tindall 
 
 
 
The U.S. war in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is the longest military conflict in 
American history. Since the initial U.S. military intervention in 2001, over 1,000 U.S. 
soldiers have been killed, and over 6,000 have been injured. Over 700 coalition soldiers 
have been killed, and 4,000 have been injured. It is estimated that over 20,000 Afghan 
civilians have also been killed. U.S. defense operations in Afghanistan have also cost 
U.S. taxpayers over $200 billion dollars. Soon after the U.S. intervention in 2001, efforts 
to develop Afghanistan’s political, economic, social, and security related institutions and 
systems have been attempted by the U.S. in order to stabilize the state. This thesis was 
designed to test the efficacy of U.S. nation-state building operations in the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan. This study analyzes the following: (1) the causes for the nation-
state-building operations in Afghanistan; (2) the constraints on the U.S. to conduct 
nation-state building operations in Afghanistan; (3) and, the political, economic, 
social/cultural, and security/military related challenges the U.S. and its allies are faced 
with in stabilizing Afghanistan. This thesis found that the U.S. operations in Afghanistan 
have not been effective in helping to establish nation-state institutions and systems. 
However, this thesis does recognize several positive attributes to the U.S. operations 
since the initial intervention took place in 2001. The thesis concludes with 
recommendations for future research and use of the data collected. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
“But whether for reasons of human rights or of security, the United States has done a lot 
of intervening over the past fifteen years, and has taken on roughly one new nation-
building commitment every other year since the end of the Cold War. We have been in 
denial about it, but we are in this business for the long haul. We’d better get used to it, 
and learn how to do it- because there will almost certainly be a next time.”  
 
―Francis Fukuyama, 2004  
 
 
The continued military presence of the U.S. in the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan is a highly debated and complex foreign policy issue in global politics and 
world affairs. For the last decade, political and social science research published about 
this issue has heavily analyzed the positive and negative consequences of historical U.S. 
foreign military and diplomatic intervention operations. A particular focus of foreign 
policy scholars, of late, has been on the U.S. military occupations in the Islamic Republic 
of Afghanistan and the Republic of Iraq. Since 2002, numerous books, articles, and 
research papers about U.S. nation-state building have described the success and 
challenges the U.S. confronted during the lead up to military conflicts, the justification 
used for military intervention, the initial planning of these interventions, the execution of 
military operations, and the rationale or “real” reason for a continued U.S. military 
presence in foreign nations. Since the Obama Administration took office in 2009 and the 
administration’s decision to send an additional 30,000 troops to the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, there have been few comprehensive research studies that exam the efficacy 
and costs associated with this U.S. nation-state building operation. This thesis attempts to 
do just that.  
The purpose of this study is to develop and provide U.S. foreign policy 
stakeholders (U.S. national security officials, members of Congress, academic/research 
 9 
institutions, and civic/citizen groups) a variety of conclusions, findings, and 
recommendations in response to U.S. nation-state building operations in the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan. It provides extensive qualitative and quantitative data about the 
causes, constraints, and challenges of U.S. interventions in the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan.  
 
THESIS STATEMENT   
 
The efficacy of U.S. nation-state building operations in the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan is questionable, at best, and the current counterinsurgency strategy has not 
been successful. Since the initial military intervention in 2001, the U.S. has failed to 
create legitimate and sustained progress in developing and creating the political, 
economic, social, and security related institutions and systems needed in order for 
Afghanistan to stabilize. U.S. actions in Afghanistan have also caused the U.S. to suffer 
human, economic, and political losses. It is imperative that the U.S. adopt a new nation-
state building strategy towards Afghanistan.      
 
THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
The primary research question of this study is: has the U.S. nation-state building 
operations in Afghanistan legitimately helped promote or develop the political, economic, 
social, and security related institutions and structures needed to stabilize and sustain a 
united state. Additionally, this research seeks to investigate the following: the causes for 
the nation-state-building operations in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan; the current 
constraints on the U.S. and its allies on creating an environment and culture for the 
peoples of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to establish the types of nation-state 
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building activities to stabilize their country; and, the current political, economic, 
social/cultural, and security/military related challenges the U.S. and its allies are faced 
with in seeking to create an environment and culture for the peoples of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan to establish the types of nation-state building activities to 
stabilize their country.  
 
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY  
 
 In order to understand the complex issues of nation-state building in the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan, it is important to assess the U.S. foreign policy to the Middle-
East for the last decade. The legacy of the Bush Administration’s approach to U.S. 
foreign policy largely includes the decision and execution of fighting the “War on 
Terror.” This phrase has become synonymous with the intelligence gathering and war 
strategies and operations conducted by the Bush Administration after the September 11, 
2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The war on terror was 
symbolically used constantly during the build up and execution of the U.S. invasion and 
occupation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Republic of Iraq. These wars 
were a part of the larger objective of the Bush Administration’s foreign policy agenda 
which maintained that the U.S. had the right to defend itself from any country that 
shelters and or aids terrorist groups and preventively attack any country that is perceived 
a national-security threat to the U.S. (Weisman. 2002).  
 The Bush Doctrine was crafted and designed by many individuals who consider 
themselves, or are considered, neo-conservative. Neo-conservatives in the Bush 
Administration advanced their ideological beliefs by conducting many military 
operations, sanctions, and isolationist tactics with the objective of trying to create or 
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foster democracy throughout the world, specifically toward many Middle-Eastern 
countries and other failed states in Africa and South America (Owens, 2008). This 
neoconservative approach to U.S. foreign policy was known for many other foreign 
policy issues, which include: the frosty relationship between the U.S. and the United 
Nations, especially after the appointment of U.N. Ambassador John Bolton, considered 
by many in the international community as a right-wing extremist; the fraud, corruption, 
and no-bid U.S. governmental contracts to many defense military contractors, including 
the Halliburton Corporation of which Vice President Dick Cheney was previously CEO; 
the harsh interrogation and torture reports of many terrorist or enemy combatants; and, 
the legal justification and security problems associated with the Guantanamo Bay 
terrorism detention facility; and the warrantless wire tapings of U.S. citizens.  
 During the first term of the Bush Administration, many U.S. national-security 
decisions were highly concentrated and coordinated by the U.S. Defense Department 
along with the Office of the Vice President. Many of these Defense Department leaders 
involved in the decision making process had numerous ties to private military 
corporations, otherwise known as the Military Industrial Complex (MIC). At President 
Eisenhower’s 1961 farewell speech to the nation, he described what the MIC was, and the 
dangers that it posed. President Eisenhower described the MIC as the relationship and 
influence of the federal government, private military contractors, and the U.S. national-
security apparatus. The MIC is the “informal and changing coalition of groups with 
vested physiological, moral, and material interests in the continuous development and 
maintenance of high levels of weaponry, in preservation of colonial markets and in 
military-strategic conceptions of internal affairs” (Pursell, 1972). As a result of the MIC 
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and the political climate after the attacks on September 11, 2001 forced the Bush 
Administration to focus a great deal of its foreign policy capital and attention on the 
Defense Department, at times overruling State Department recommendations, especially 
the design and execution of the operations in the wars in Islamic Republics of 
Afghanistan and Iraq (Herspring, 2008).   
 When the Obama Administration took office in January 2009, many in the 
international community were excited for a change in U.S. direction and approach to U.S. 
foreign policy (Amanpour, 2009). The Obama Administration tried to capitalize on this 
excitement by having Secretary of State Hillary Rodham-Clinton give a series of 
speeches highlighting the Obama administration’s approach to U.S. foreign policy and 
international relations in 2009. These speeches tried to differentiate the new approach 
from that of the Bush administrations. In a speech at the U.S. Agency for International 
Development, Secretary Clinton said the new U.S. foreign policy approach included three 
foundational pillars, namely defense, development, and diplomacy. Secretary Clinton 
reiterated the importance of development in U.S. foreign policy decision making at many 
subsequent speeches noting that "today, it is a strategic, economic and moral imperative -
- as central to advancing American interests and solving global problems as diplomacy 
and defense" (Clinton, 2010).  
 In spite of this optimism and stated policy differences to U.S. foreign, the Obama 
administration has essentially maintained many of the same foreign policies and 
operations as the Bush Administration. These operations include warrantless 
wiretappings of American citizens, the usage of military tribunals for suspected terrorists, 
and drone military attacks. It has also kept many former Bush Administration Defense 
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and national-security leaders in his administration, including Defense Secretary Robert 
Gates, General Stanley McCrystal, and National Security Counterterrorism Advisor John 
Brennon, and Director of National Intelligence Denis Blair, among many other 
(Grennwald, 2009).  Many of these officials helped design and execute the initial military 
response to the September 11, 2001 attacks and the war on terror.  
 
FAILED, FAILING, AND WEAK NATION-STATES 
 
Both Bush and Obama Administrations have similar policy approaches when 
dealing with, or addressing, issues concerning failed, failing, and or weak nation-states. 
The political, economic, social, and security impacts caused, instigated, or exacerbated by 
failed states have resulted in the following foreign policy concerns: an increase in 
regional conflicts and instability; an expansion of states providing shelter to or harboring 
terrorists, terrorist groups, and or their supporters; an increase in the recruitment and 
training of indigenous populations; and an increase in local crime. Due to these concerns 
the Bush and Obama Administrations have reacted to certain failed states with tactics and 
strategies, including, isolation, non-engagement, and military engagement.     
There is no single universal accepted definition or criteria of what constitutes a 
failed, failing, or weak nation-state. There have been hundreds of international debates, 
studies, and analysis of how to best define these types of states. For purposes of this 
paper, the Crises States Research Center’s (CSRC, 2006) definition will be adopted. The 
CSRC defines a failed state as “a state that can no longer perform its basic security and 
development functions and that has no effective control over its territory and borders. A 
failed state is one that can no longer reproduce the conditions for its own existence.” 
States that are deemed failed, failing, or weak align with this definition due to not having 
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a central/federal government, or have one that is ineffective or incapable of securing the 
states interests and its people. States that align with this CSRC definition are also likely 
to house internal and external terrorist organizations, criminal warlords, and are also 
likely to be experiencing some form of religious or ethnic conflict. All of these factors 
contribute to an ineffective state central government. 
We will also adopt the U.S. Fund for Peaces overarching criteria that are used to 
define a failed state. These criteria include “the loss of physical control of its territory, or 
of the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force therein; an erosion of legitimate 
authority to make collective decisions; an inability to provide reasonable public services, 
and; an inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international 
community.” Also adopted is the U.S. Fund for Peaces assessment that a failing or weak 
state is “often in conflict, at risk of conflict and instability, or newly emerging from 
conflict; hampered by poor governance, corruption, and inadequate provisions of 
fundamental public services to its citizens; weak and failing states may lack effective 
control of their territory, military, or law enforcement; and one of the poorest countries in 
the world” (U.S. Fund for Peace, 2007).  
These criteria were adopted because they strongly align with current research 
conducted about the challenges confronting the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. There 
are also many comprehensive studies about various attempts from external and internal 
actors attempting to address the specific challenges of a failed state, as outlined in the 
U.S. Fund for Peaces criteria. Adopting these criteria would benefit this study by 
allowing an effortless utilization of the extensive research already conducted on failed 
states, such as Afghanistan, to strengthen the arguments raised in this paper.  
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Table 1.1: The Fund for Peaces “Failed States Index 2009.” 
 
 
     Alert      Warning      No Information / Dependent Territory      Moderate      Sustainable 
  
1. Somalia 11. Cote d’Ivoire 
2. Zimbabwe 12. Haiti 
3. Sudan 13. Burma 
4. Chad 14. Kenya 
5. Democratic Republic of the Congo 15. Nigeria 
6. Iraq 16. Ethiopia 
7. Afghanistan 17. North Korea 
8. Central African Republic 18. Yemen 
9. Guinea 19. Bangladesh 
10. Pakistan 20. Timor-Leste 
 
The international community has had a long history of trying to improve the 
circumstances of these nation-states by providing development assistance and governance 
support. Thousands of indigenous and international NGO’s have also worked in many of 
these nations over long periods of time. Although the world community has long worked 
to improve many of these countries, the U.S. has only recently attempted to pursue a 
comprehensive strategy to address failed, failing and or weak nations. Many current 
initiatives, such as the U.S. Fund for Peace: Indicators and their Measures, being used 
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today by the U.S. were developed several decades ago. These initiatives include 
“development assistance, cooperation and diplomacy, post-conflict stability operations; 
interagency cooperation; and conflict and early warning systems.” (U.S. Fund for Peace. 
2007) These initiatives have largely been under-funded, understaffed, and underutilized 
in U.S. military, diplomatic, and development operations. This is reflected in 
organizations like the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
which have historically been hampered in its core mission and services. 
 
U.S. MILITARY & NATION-STATE BUILDING INTERVENTIONS   
 
U.S. foreign military intervention operations have consistently been a part of 
American history. Since 1960, there have been over seventy-five different types of U.S. 
foreign military interventions. Many of these military interventions were justified as 
humanitarian relief and defense and security related operations. After the launch of many 
foreign military interventions the U.S. and its international allies often conduct nation-
state building operations in order to help rebuild or establish democratic institutions, 
systems, and structures. The following chart lists some of the U.S. military interventions 
throughout the world.   
Table 1.2: Global Policy Forum, “U.S. Interventions” December 2005  
1961 Cuba CIA-backed Bay of Pigs invasion. 
1964 Brazil CIA-backed military coup overthrows the 
government of Joao Goulart and Gen. Castello 
Branco takes power. 
1965-1975 Vietnam Large commitment of military forces, including 
air, naval and ground units numbering up to 
500,000+ troops.  
1965 Indonesia CIA-backed army coup overthrows President 
Sukarno and brings Gen. Suharto to power. 
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1966 Ghana CIA-backed military coup ousts President 
Kwame Nkrumah. 
1969-1975 Cambodia CIA supports military coup against Prince 
Sihanouk, bringing Lon Nol to power.  
1973 Chile CIA-backed military coup ousts government of 
President Salvador Allende. Gen. Augusto 
Pinochet comes to power. 
1990-1991 Iraq Major military operation, including naval 
blockade, air strikes. 
1993-1995 Bosnia Active military involvement with air and ground 
forces. 
2001 Afghanistan Air attacks and ground operations oust Taliban 
government and install a new regime. 
2003 Iraq Invasion with large ground, air and naval forces 
ousts government of Saddam Hussein and 
establishes new government. 
 
 
NATION-STATE BUILDING 
  
Nation-State building is a recent term that combines the theories of nation-
building and state-building, due to the interconnected relationship between the two 
different theories (Winderl, 1998). State-building is the process of creating or developing 
governmental institutions needed in order to stabilize and develop a nation-state. These 
institutions include political, economic, security, and democratic governmental 
agencies/institutions. Nation-building is the process of creating or developing a national-
identity, national values, and national-traditions. These are established by the creation of 
a national anthem, flag, language, religion, recognized ethnic and religious groups, and 
standardized public services designed to help address social and cultural issues in a 
nation-state (Shamoo, 2009).  
For purposes of this research study, the term nation-state building will use the 
combined definitions stated above and will be defined as the process of creating or 
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developing governmental institutions, a national-identity, national values, and national-
traditions needed in order to stabilize and develop a nation-state. The argument to use this 
new term includes the theory that in order to have legitimate and effective state-building 
projects, nation-building operations must also be also developed in order to unify internal 
divisions and fractions which might threaten the sustainability and success of new 
governmental institutions.       
There are a number of studies that have analyzed the U.S. nation-state building 
approach to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. These studies illuminate the 
international damage done to the U.S. by the military intervention, the counterinsurgency 
operations, and the nation-state building activities in Afghanistan (Rubin, 2006). These 
interventions have increased the cynicism of the efficacy and efficiency in which the U.S. 
conducts its military and nation-state building interventions (Jones, 2008). Now that the 
U.S. is projected to have a military presence in Afghanistan for the next decade, it is 
important to understand the costs and benefits associated with U.S. nation-state building 
operations. 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY  
 
The remainder of this paper seeks to analyze and explore the causes, constraints, 
challenges for the U.S. nation-state building interventions in Afghanistan. Chapter 2 of 
this thesis will present a review of literature that will address important information about 
this topic and the research questions posed. Chapter 3 will describe the research methods 
used to test the thesis research questions. Chapter 4 will analyze the results of the 
research methods that will be used. Chapter 5 will conclude the paper with several 
recommendations and further areas of potential investigation.    
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
This chapter provides an intellectual and theoretical analysis of the U.S. nation-
state building operations in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Specifically it provides 
greater clarity of the concept of nation-state-building and counterinsurgency operations, 
including an outline of the historical successful and unsuccessful attempts at 20
th
 century 
U.S. foreign intervention operations. It also includes an analysis of the political, 
economic, social/cultural, and security/military related constraints and challenges in 
which the U.S. and its allies are attempting to address or are significantly impacting 
current counterinsurgency and nation-sate building operations in Afghanistan.  
The quantitative and qualitative data collected in this chapter will be the basis in 
which this research study will use to construct a nation-state building evaluation rubric, 
which will be used in the methodology chapter. The evaluation rubric will contain criteria 
in which this research study uses to measure current U.S. nation-state building operations 
in Afghanistan. The criteria established in this evaluation rubric and based on what 
current research on nation-state building has determined should be the goal and or 
outcome for any foreign nation-state building project. From this assessment, this research 
study is able to assess the validity of the primary and secondary research questions. All of 
the above mentioned components of this chapter help provide a stronger justification for 
why this research study is advantageous to the field of public administration and to 
current and future U.S. nation-state building operations.   
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BACKGROUND ON THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN 
 
In order to understand the efficacy of U.S. nation-state building operations in 
Afghanistan, it is important to reflect the many challenges this country has had in the 
recent past which continue to impact the country today. The Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan has had a long history of internal conflict and external interventions. Before 
Afghanistan was a unified country, it consisted of a dozen or so different tribes. Many of 
these tribes often had battles or conflicts between and among themselves. The largest of 
these tribes consisted of the Pashtun people. These tribes were officially unified in 1747 
by Ahmad Shah Durrani. However, within a short period of time, ethnic, religious, and 
territorial conflict caused the newly formed state to be unstable.  
This instability was not helped by the British occupation of Afghanistan during 
the height of British colonialism. After Afghanistan achieved its independence in the 
early 20
th
 century, it slowly was making progress to stabilize and democratize (CIA, 
2010). However, the little progress that was made was quickly stopped by a several coups 
on the federal government. Soon after, the Soviet Union invaded and occupied 
Afghanistan during the height of the Cold War. In response, the U.S. helped arm local 
Islamic fundamentalist of various tribal backgrounds, known as the mujahideen, to fight 
the Soviets. The mujahideen were eventually successful in forcing the Soviet Union to 
end their occupation. It is important to note that the occupation resulted in the death of 
over one million Afghans, and the displacement of over five million to neighboring 
countries.  
 Soon after the Soviet occupation, Afghanistan was plagued by different civil 
wars, which led to the federal government in Kabul to eventually be overthrown by the 
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Taliban in 1996. The Taliban ended the various civil wars in Afghanistan, however 
instituted their fundamentalist Islamic ideology in the laws, politics, cultural, and 
economy throughout the nation-state. The Taliban were eventually overthrown by the 
U.S. in Kabul for providing sanctuary to Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden (Kahler, 2008). 
It is important to note that one of the reasons why September 11, 2001 happened was due 
to the international community failing to implement the 2000 U.N. Brahimi report 
recommendations, which was designed to address the incoherence, tribalism, and 
divisions in the failed states recognized by the U.N. The attacks on 9/11 quickened 
developed nation-states to work harder and invest more in addressing the growing 
dangers that failed states can have on international stability and national security (Rubin, 
2006). After the U.S. invasion, many remaining members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban 
hid in the Afghanistan and Pakistan borders. Soon after the invasion, Afghanistan elected 
a democratic government headed by President Hamid Karzai. Since the initial military 
intervention in 2001, U.S. armed forces have remained in Afghanistan conducting 
counterinsurgency operations against the Taliban who have re-emerged and are one of the 
leading insurgents against U.S. nation-state building operations.      
 
U.S. NATION-STATE BUILDING OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN  
  
 The Obama Administration’s “A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan” 
largely resembles the Bush Administration’s policy towards Afghanistan. The similar 
administration policies include the objectives of defeating terrorists, establishing an 
effective Afghanistan government, develop an Afghan security force, and establishing an 
Afghan economy. The Obama administration, however, has spent ample resources and an 
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increase in U.S. troops on the Afghanistan/Pakistan border where they have worked to 
capture or kill members of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Osama Bin Laden.  
 The Obama administration, like the Bush administration, has also continued the 
practice of utilizing military contractors in the training and counterinsurgency efforts in 
the state. One difference in the new administration is that it has worked to provide nation-
state building operations outside of the Kabul region. Through these additional military 
contractors and the support of foreign allies it has sought to address issues previously not 
resourced such as governance building through the provincial governments, increase 
NGO efforts, and the further elimination of narcotics.     
Defeating Al Qaeda and the Taliban are currently the leading justifications used 
by the U.S. in response to the almost decades long occupation of Afghanistan and for 
maintaining a military presence in the country for years to come. In order to defeat Al 
Qaeda and the Taliban, the U.S. and its allies have been working to build and or rebuild 
Afghan institutions and structures in support of U.S. efforts and in support of the needs of 
the local Afghan people. This building effort is a typical response used by foreign 
interventionist in order to help eliminate instability and to provide better opportunities for 
a sustained decreases in violence (Tilly, 1975). For the last decade, the U.S. and allied 
nations have been working to develop Afghanistan’s state structures in order to stabilize 
the state from internal and external threats and security concerns, and to help provide 
basic human services to the Afghan people (CHR, 2006).  
The efficacy of U.S. nation-state building operations in Afghanistan has always 
been in question since the initial military intervention took place. Many have called on 
the U.S. to re-design their current military and developmental strategy by placing more 
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emphasis on helping to create legitimate and accountable institutions than deal with the 
countries economic, poverty, and unemployment related issues rather than only 
security/military related institutions and services (OECOD, 2008). Many have also 
argued for more formal governmental structures to be established that deliver goods and 
services in support of the indigenous population (Fritz, 2007). Ensuring this type of 
nation-state building operations would likely be a long-term, violent, and costly process. 
However, if implemented, it would provide a failed state like Afghanistan more sustained 
security and stability. Another growing concern of the U.S. occupation in Afghanistan 
that has arisen over the last several years is the lack of an accountable, federal and 
provincial government that is capable of providing leadership to the many needs of the 
Afghan people. Without this vital component of nation-state building, efforts to increase 
the likelihood of a sustained government capable of defeating internal and external 
threats will be nearly impossible to achieve (Winderl, 1998).       
 One of the fundamental issues many have with the U.S. operations in Afghanistan 
is the notion that nation-state building should only be a process that should be started by 
local actors and not external actors (Whaite, 2008). This argument is often contradicted 
by the view that nation-state building operations, in most recent history, should be 
conducted by external actors due to the inability and possible conflict in allowing internal 
actors to establish or re-establish governmental systems. However, more recent research 
on nation-state building operations advocate for domestic indigenous peoples to take 
greater leadership within nation-state building operations, while external actors should 
provide a more supporting role by allocating resources and security to the domestic 
populous (Chandler, 2004).  
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There are many that have criticized U.S. nation-state building operations because it is 
largely focused on providing security while neglecting to effectively engaging the indigenous 
Afghan people into the nation-state building operations process (Shamoo, 2009). There are 
also complaints that U.S. efforts have not been effective in ceasing hostilities among and 
between the various tribes in Afghanistan (Gardizi, 2006). One of the reasons why 
incorporating the local indigenous population into the decision making process and working 
to unify tribal and ethnic differences is important, is based on the long-lasting research that 
has proven that this approach leads to state stability and a more unified populous (Lun, 
2009). By focusing only on stabilizing a nation-state through a military intervention, due 
to perceived national or international security threats, external actors will most likely 
leave this nation-state in an even more unstable condition (Fukuyama, 2004).  
 
THE AFGHANISTAN CHALLENGE 
 
 There are many challenges confronting the U.S. and coalition forces in their 
attempt to conduct nation-state building operations in Afghanistan. This chapter will 
provide a brief analysis of the political, economic, social/cultural, and security/military 
related challenges confronted U.S. and coalition operations. These challenges are 
complex, interconnected, and are vitally important components that the nation-state 
building operations in Afghanistan should seek to address. 
 
POLITICAL CHALLENGES 
 
 One of the most pressing issues in recent world events is the challenging U.S. 
relationship with Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the Afghan government. Research 
maintains that a central impediment to any U.S. or international effort in Afghanistan is 
the structure of the Afghan government (Sinha, 2009). The Afghan government is 
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structured to have a strong executive presidency and a very weak legislative branch. In 
order for the U.S. to conduct legitimate nation-state building operations, it is important to 
not to give the appearance of undermining a democratically elected head of state. 
However, by propping up the Karzi administration, which many Afghans and foreign 
U.S. allies consider corrupt, undermines and challenges the types of initiatives the U.S. is 
attempting to conduct in Afghanistan.  
 Finding a political balance between these challenges is vital in order for U.S. 
objectives to be achieved. Another significant challenge to U.S. and Afghan nation-state 
building efforts is the current imbalance shown by external and internal institutions that 
focus a significant proportion of their resources and activities on Kabul while neglecting 
the other provinces. Although coalition forces are scattered throughout Afghanistan, their 
troop and developmental forces are limited to the tasks and challenges assigned to them. 
This current process is effectively leaving the regional provinces to the hands of local war 
lords and tribal religious leaders.  
 In the last five years, numerous research studies have been investigating the 
structural issues within the U.S. federal government which have greatly impacted the way 
in which nation-state building services are delivered in Afghanistan (Dobbins, 2008). 
Recent research on U.S. operations in Afghanistan have advocated that the current 
practice of allowing the Department of Defense to lead and be responsible for key 
diplomatic and development related activities in Afghanistan be curtailed and that the 
State Department resume authority and provide direction for Afghanistan nation-state 
building operations. A re-evaluation and re-design of the role of senior executive officers 
within the Department of Defense and the role of Foreign Service Officers within the 
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U.S. State Department should also take place. This is due to the viewpoint that military 
officers in the Defense Department have expanded their roles to such an extent that career 
service experts in diplomatic and developmental operations for the State Department 
have been relegated to mere minor positions in relation to the decision making process 
for U.S. national security interests. The role and funding of the USAID be enhanced and 
that the Departments of State and Defense work more collaboratively with USAID in 
attempts at nation-state building in Afghanistan.  
 
ECONOMIC CHALLENGES 
 
 When analyzing the U.S. nation-state building operations and the current state of 
progress in Afghanistan, it is apparent that the U.S. and its allies have failed to really 
tackle Afghanistan’s historical economic and funding challenges. Throughout the 
academic literature, arguments have been made that one of the most challenging aspects 
in Afghanistan is the ability and capacity to improve Afghanistan’s economic situation, 
including its illegal economy, governmental institutions, and foreign aid expectations 
(Rubin, 2006). Most of Afghanistan’s economy is based on the narcotics trade. Research 
indicates that the narcotics industry has influence in every branch of the Afghanistan 
government, including the armed forces which are being trained by the U.S. to help 
eliminate Afghanistan’s opium fields, and are working ferociously to maintain this 
industries relevance, power, and growing capabilities.  
 Another vital issue confronting Afghanistan is that it currently relies too heavily 
on international aid to help maintain the states security and human services. This 
dependence makes Afghanistan a puppet state for the developed nations and international 
bodies that have always subjugated Afghanistan to unfair and unreasonable expectations 
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(Gardizi, 2006). According to the World Bank (2004), other important economic 
challenges confronting Afghanistan include the weak rule of law, the drug trade, political 
insecurity, and derailed reconstruction efforts. Thus, the Bank notes Afghanistan’s 
poverty and unemployment rates will continue to increase if nation-state building efforts 
do not address these issues; and that the long-term projected cost of having to sustain a 
$1billion security force is unsustainable and will force Afghanistan to rely heavily on 
external actors, which will hamper progress made in providing services to the Afghan 
people other than security or protection (Rubin, 2006).  
 
SOCIAL/CULTURAL CHALLENGES 
 
 Since the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan few foreign aid and NGO 
programs have worked to improve the social and cultural related challenges which are 
affecting the unity and cohesion among many Afghans in the nation-state building 
operation process (Schutte, 2004). Research indicates that provides social and cultural 
related services, particularly to war torn nations like Afghanistan, provided coping 
capabilities for the native populous to be able to manage or reduce the level of 
psychological and physical trauma they may have experiences. Basic social and cultural 
services, typically found in most developed countries and even some developing 
countries, are lacking. The social and cultural services provided by the Afghan 
government are largely found in Kabul and not in many of the other cities and provinces 
in the state. Services lacking include, among other, hospitals, public schools for all, 
clothing stores, public service training facilities, youth activity facilities, and sports and 
recreational facilities. 
 28 
There are a variety of reasons why many of these services are not provided, 
including security concerns, but it is important to understand how the lack of political, 
economic, and security related progress in the state impact the state’s social issues and 
vice versa. It is also important to note that role and influence of war lords, the Taliban, 
and ethnic and religious groups that influence the types of activities the native populous 
may or may not enjoy (Gardizi, 2006).  
 
SECURITY/MILITARY CHALLENGES 
 
 Providing security and military support to the Afghan people has been one of the 
most challenging U.S. nation-state building operations since the initial U.S. military 
intervention in 2001.   The U.S. was ill-prepared to go into Iraq and Afghanistan for a 
number of reasons. Regardless of the reasons, it has placed a great constrain to the 
effectiveness on the mission in which the military was given (Laughrey, 2008). Due to 
the military having poor language capabilities and knowledge of the cultures of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. counterinsurgency and nation-state building operations 
were not effective in communicating and forming relationships with the native 
indigenous peoples throughout the course of the intervention.  
Due to the U.S. failure in the early years of its intervention to build a “competent” 
Afghan security apparatus, the Taliban and other insurgent groups have taken advantage 
and gained control of rural and urban provinces outside of the Kabul. This is happening 
while the U.S. forces have to recruit and train a highly illiterate and easily corrupted 
Afghan armed force. There is also rampant corruption among U.S. military contractors 
who have not fulfilled contractual agreements. The long-term security sustainability in 
Afghanistan relies heavily in the countries police and armed forces (Jones, 2008). 
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Without an effective Afghan security presence established it will be hard for U.S. and 
allied troops to leave the nation due to concerns over the Taliban and regional stability. 
 
SUCCESSFUL NATION-STATE BUILDING CRITERIA 
 
 The criteria established in this section, is derived from governmental and 
academic research institutions. It was collected to help establish the criteria in which this 
research study will use to assess current U.S. nation-state building operations in 
Afghanistan. Criteria collected have been compartmentalized in four major categories. 
These categories include: political development, economic development, 
security/military development, and social/cultural development.   
 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT CRITERIA  
 
 There are many who argue that successful nation-state building efforts should 
work to involve a “political transition from authoritarianism (or totalitarianism) to a more 
participatory form of government” (Thapa, 2008). Essentially, nation-state building 
operations should work to formalize the “pillars” of a democracy. In order to achieve this 
type of political aspiration, nation-state building operations should work to ensure that 
regional, ethnic, and religious institutions are created and that the populations reflecting 
these segments are incorporated in all aspect of the federal executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches. This aspiration will be especially hard to accomplish for countries that 
have a long histories of internal conflict and external intervention, such as Afghanistan. 
However, in order for nation-state building operations to leave positive and sustainable 
impacts after external actors have left the state, political development within the state 
must be accomplished.   
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 Others argue that in order to have a strong democracy, nation-state building 
efforts must work to bring reconciliation and a strong, credible, and enforceable judicial 
system. The UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights has designed a 
process in which legal credibility within any new judicial system can be established 
through the creation of truth and justice commissions. The Organisation for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development’s (OECD) State Building in Situations of Fragility 
maintains that a belief in the political and legal sectors of newly formed nation-state 
institutions increase the engagement between the population and the state. OECD argues 
that nation-state building operations should work to provide a “virtuous cycle of 
legitimacy” and that legitimacy can be produced by having “effective and equitable” 
services, a participatory form of government, constitutional rule of law, accountability 
mechanisms, and through international support.  It is important to note that creating 
legitimate legal and political sectors may be extremely hard to accomplish in a state such 
as Afghanistan due to the widespread systematic corruption within the Afghan 
government, and the lack of trust within the Afghan people due to security concerns, and 
the effects of having a large populous that is unemployed and illiterate.       
 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CRITERIA 
 
 There is substantial literature available that has argued that one of the effects of 
maintaining a long protracted armed conflict, such as the war in Afghanistan, is that it 
can produce a “retarded” economic impact that significantly weakens the long-term 
growth of that country (Thapa, 2008). The effects of a “retarded” economic impact can 
result in the displacement or people, property, investments, opportunities, and markets. 
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Research indicates that one of the important components of nation-state building 
operations should always be to help build or rebuild economic and monetary institutions. 
By creating these institutions, a state that has historically had challenges confronting 
long-term unemployment and high poverty, will have a greater chance in stabilizing a 
failed nation-state. This will be a significant challenge in Afghanistan due to the 
prospects of having a recently failed state adopting economic systems that have been 
developed over centuries, used by highly developed nations.  
 Recent research maintains that nation-state building operations should work to 
improve the economic conditions in the state through poverty prevention and reduction 
strategies (Walle, 2009). This would entail nation-state building activities that would 
work to hire police officers, teachers, and other public service related professionals after 
receiving educational and training preparation. This would help increase the likelihood 
for the native population to have a stronger loyalty to the state. Throughout the history of 
nation-state building operations, this critical aspect has typically not been a priority 
within development initiatives due to security issues, governance and political conflicts, 
and the lack of a sustained support system in place to manage these types of employment 
opportunities.     
 OECD argues that another aspect to economic development through nation-state 
building would be the formulation of administrative capacity. This capacity is through the 
creation of public financial management systems which has the ability to raise funds, 
collect taxes, and monitor the state’s economic growth. OECD argues that in order to 
strengthen regional and central government institutions for the long-term development of 
the state, this administrative capacity will need to be created to assist in the reducing 
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external dependency on donor support. OECD maintains that establishing taxes from the 
population will increase their participation in government and engage the population in 
working to hold the government accountable. Other activities would also need to be made 
such as property rights and trade issues.  
 
SOCIAL/CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CRITERIA 
  
 The engagement of civil societies and the native populous in the decision making 
process and in the operations of nation-state building has been a constant throughout 
many academic research studies (Uvin, 2006). This engagement would occur through the 
promotion of NGO organizations and local grassroots organizations in the coordination, 
advocacy, and implementation of state-building activities. These activities would include 
having the federal and regional governments engaging NGO’s and grassroots 
organizations to do the following: issue-specific conversations between community 
meetings; assisting in the delivery of social services; provide opportunities to hold 
conflict mediated dispute resolutions between conflicting local parties; and work to 
engage community residents in local political activities. Uvin and Cohen argue that these 
sorts of activities increase the likelihood for long-term state-building success. It is 
important to note that in many failed states, NGO’s had either left or are prevented from 
entering the state due to security issues. Until safety and security is provided to local 
communities where NGO’s would work, NGO’s and grassroots organizations will not be 
able to do the vital work in which they excel in providing.   
 Others argue that nation-state building operations should be standardized in order 
to contribute to the “creation of a common culture through the presence of similar and 
readily identifiable public services” (Walle 2009). This standardization would include the 
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recognition and classification of citizens and groups; an integrated curriculum for public 
schools; freedom of the press; freedom of religion; the creation of post offices; the 
uniforms for governmental employees; the recognition of a national flag and anthem; and 
a national television and radio programs. Having these culturally symbolic types of 
standardized services provided to both regional and centralized locations throughout the 
state would help create a sustain nation-state objectives.   
 
SECURITY/MILITARY DEVELOPMENT CRITERIA 
 
 One of the most important aspects of nation-state building and counterinsurgency 
operations should be the building and development of a states security and military 
related institutions and systems (Dobbins, 2008). Research indicates that nation-state 
building should engage the native population in the beginning stages of an intervention. 
One of the troubles many military interventions typically have is the failure to secure the 
entire state and its borders, not just the nation’s capitol within a short period of time. 
Research maintains that when a foreign intervention occurs it is important that these 
troops be dispersed throughout the state, including local tribal communities, and not just 
to the central government (Bullimore, 2006).  
 It is vital for these troops to be immersed in local communities to ensure that war 
lords, foreign agents, or other security threats will not have the chance to grow or cause 
conflict in these regions at the rate in which would occur should these troops not be there. 
During these initial military interventions it is important for foreign troops to engage 
these local communities through the building on infrastructure projects and the hiring of 
police agents. This engagement will be difficult, however it will provide the military an 
opportunity to learn more about the native culture, to find best ways to improve these 
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communities, and ensure that these communities, in-time, develop the capacity to govern 
themselves.  
 In all these operations, time to implement these objectives would need to be 
balanced and conditions based due to the human, insurgent, cultural, and financial 
challenges. However, these basic tenants should be an important foundational objective 
for any nation-state building operations. These tenants should help effectively address 
some other important issues impacting the state such as governance building, poverty 
reduction, and elimination of terrorist organizations or criminal warlords.  
 
COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS 
 
 A vitally important aspect to the development of security and military related 
institutions and structures, especially after a foreign military intervention, is 
counterinsurgency operations. Counterinsurgency operations and nation-state building 
operations go hand in hand with one another. Recent counterinsurgency operations have 
been used to help create, sustain, and develop the nation-state building projects initiated 
since the U.S. military intervention took place in Afghanistan. Counterinsurgency theory 
argues that armed forces are needed and should be used to fight off indigenous or foreign 
groups seeking to prevent nation-state building projects from taking place. These groups 
are the insurgency. In order to defeat these insurgents the U.S. and its foreign allies have 
created counterinsurgency operations aimed at defeating these counterproductive 
movements.  
 The U.S. Department of Defense’s Counterinsurgency Operations manual defines 
counterinsurgency as “those military, paramilitary, economic, psychological, and civic 
actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.” One of the overarching goals of the 
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U.S. Department of Defense in maintaining a large number of U.S. troops in these foreign 
lands, for extended periods of time, is to “neutralize the insurgent and, together with 
population and resources control measures, establish an environment within which 
political, social, and economic progress is possible.”     
Recent research on future counterinsurgency efforts argue for the U.S. to work 
and engage local communities to not only support their efforts and their intelligence 
operations, but to also work with the state by being ground combatants, border security 
agents, intelligence agents, and information operatives. This engagement will need to be 
done after U.S. and allied troops train, mentor, and sufficient support to these indigenous 
agents of the state. This comprehensive approach will enable foreign troops and 
development agents to spend more time addressing other important nation-building 
operations, such as political and economic development sustainability and development.   
 There are many of who have argued that there is no single “template solution to 
civil wars and insurrections” however there are lessons that can be learned by past 
counterinsurgency experiences (Sepp, 2005). After examining previous U.S. 
counterinsurgency operations, some argue that future foreign civil and military 
interventions conducted in response to or as an aftermath of a military intervention 
should be focused on the countries people and the people’s belief and support in their 
newly formed or changed government. The list below reflects current research findings 
on what constitutes successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency operations.  
Table 2.1: Counterinsurgency Measurements for Success (Galula, 1964) 
  Successful Unsuccessful 
Emphasis on intelligence. 
Primacy of military direction of 
counterinsurgency. 
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Focus on population, their needs, and 
security. 
Priority to “kill-capture” enemy, not 
on engaging population. 
Secure areas established, expanded. Battalion-size operations as the norm. 
Insurgents isolated from population 
(population control). 
Military units concentrated on large 
bases for protection. 
Amnesty and rehabilitation for 
insurgents. Special forces focused on raiding. 
Police in lead; military supporting. 
Adviser effort a low priority in 
personnel assignment. 
Police force expanded, diversified. 
Building, training indigenous army in 
image of U.S. Army. 
Special forces, advisers embedded with 
indigenous forces. Peacetime government processes. 
Insurgent sanctuaries denied. Open borders, airspace, coastlines. 
 
It is important to note that it is not entirely valid or even possible to adopt the 
same method a foreign external actor may have used in the conduction of a purported 
successful nation-state building operation and try to replicate that same method to that of 
another country. For example, the German and Japanese nation-state building operations 
are thought of as successful due to their sustained economic and political reform 
capabilities after World War II (Dobbins, 2008). One of the many reasons why 
Germany’s and Japans nation-state building operations were successful was due to the 
both nations having, essentially, a homogenous society with few ethnic minorities or 
religious differences. Germany was surrounded by other democratic and western nations. 
Also, both Germany and Japan had previously established local and national systems of 
government including established economic and legal institutions. So to compare the 
nation-state building constraints and challenges of countries like Somalia, Yemen, and 
Rwanda to countries like Germany and Japan would not be appropriate due to the ethnic, 
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socioeconomic, and tribal differences that have challenged many of these nations for 
centuries.    
 
SUMMARY 
 There are a plethora of research studies that have examined U.S. nation-state 
building and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. This review of literature 
provides a critical overview of the main themes/arguments and a number important 
policy platforms about nation-state building operations, and methods on how to measure 
its effectiveness. This information is vital to the understanding of the issues confronting 
the U.S. relationship with the Afghanistan. It also provides a brief synopsis of the known 
causes, constraints, challenges, and opportunities for advancement in U.S. nation-state 
building operations, including the criteria and measurements of successful nation-state 
building operations. The review assists us in the design of recommendations to address 
the research questions and the main arguments of this paper.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The U.S. has been conducting nation-state building operations in Afghanistan for 
over nine years, and is projected to be in Afghanistan for the next decade. The hypothesis 
of this thesis is that U.S. nation-state building operations in Afghanistan have not likely 
made legitimate progress in helping to promote or develop the types of institutions and 
structures needed to stabilize the state or reduce the influence of the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda. In order to analyze the efficacy of U.S. efforts in the last eight years and to 
suggest policy recommendations for the U.S. to adopt in order to move forward in its 
nation-state building activities, this chapter details the research design and methodology 
adopted in this study, including an elaboration of the research question, hypothesis and 
variables measued in this study.  
 
THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Has U.S. nation-state building operations in Afghanistan legitimately helped to 
promote or develop the political, economic, social, and security related institutions and 
structures needed to stabilize and sustain a united state and eliminate the influence of Al 
Qaeda and the Taliban?  
 
THE RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
This thesis will test the efficacy of U.S. nation-state building operations in 
Afghanistan. The following figure will provide the method in which this thesis paper will 
attempt to test the hypothesis. By answering the research question and the subsequent 
secondary research questions we will be able to determine if the hypothesis is valid or 
invalid.  
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Table 3.1: The Research Design 
                  
   
THE RESEARCH 
QUESTION      
           
  
1. Has the U.S. nation-state building operation's in Afghanistan helped 
create or develop the institutions and systems needed for that 
country to stabilize and eliminate the influence of the Taliban & Al 
Qaeda? 
     
   ↙  ↘      
           
  2. No    4.  Yes     
  ↓    ↓     
  
3. Hypothesis 
Confirmed    
5. Ways/Evidence of 
successful nation-state 
building available?     
     ↙  ↘    
    6. No     8. Yes   
    ↓    ↓   
    
 7. Hypothesis 
Confirmed     
9. 
Hypothesis 
Falsified   
           
                  
 
 The above figure highlights the questions that will be answered during the 
progress of this thesis. Box 1 highlights the primary research question of this thesis. Box 
2 and 3 indicates that the thesis has been confirmed and that U.S. nation-state building 
operations in Afghanistan have not been effective in building institutions and systems 
needed to stabilize the state and eliminate the influence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Box 
4 and 5 indicates that further analysis needs to be conducted in order to determine if the 
hypothesis is confirmed or falsified. Box 6 and 7 indicate that there is no credible 
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evidence of successful U.S. nation-state building operations in Afghanistan. This will 
indicate that the thesis hypothesis is confirmed. Box 8 and 9 will indicate that the 
hypothesis is falsified.  
 
THE SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The following secondary research questions were created in order to assess if U.S. 
nation-state building operations in Afghanistan have promoted, and or developed, the 
types of political, economic, social, and security related institutions and services it sought 
to create or re-build since the initial military interventions were launched. In answering 
the following secondary questions we will be able to prove that there is, or is not, efficacy 
in the U.S. operations in Afghanistan it is important to make this paper as scientific and 
objective as possible: 
 What were/are the causes for the nation-state building interventions in 
Afghanistan? From researching the causes or “root causes” of the U.S. interventions in 
Afghanistan we will be able to gather specific data about the perception and or the 
rational used to defend the decision to interven in Afghanistan. This data is useful in the 
research and assessment of the U.S. response to these causes. From this research and 
assessment we will be able to identify the U.S. successes or failures in its responses to 
these causes. 
What are the current constraints on the U.S. and its allies on creating an 
environment and culture for the peoples of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to 
establish the types of nation-state building activities to stabilize their country? From 
researching the constraints, or obstacles placed on, or effecting U.S. and allied nation 
attempts to conduct nation-state building operations in Afghanistan we will be able to 
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research historical alternatives used in previous cases with similar 
situations/backgrounds. This research could be used in the formulation of possible 
recommendations to address these constraints.  
What are the current political, economic, social/cultural, and security/military 
related challenges the U.S. and its allies are faced with in seeking to create an 
environment and culture for the peoples of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to 
establish the types of nation-state building activities to stabilize their country? These 
research questions will indicate if there are any U.S. nation-state building operations in 
Afghanistan that matter or not. From this analysis we will be able to research, evaluate, 
and then propose responses to and or recommendations to the successes or failures of the 
U.S. responses to these challenges.   
 
HAS THERE BEEN AN IMPACT/EVALUATION RUBRIC 
 
 From gathering qualitative and quantitative data about U.S. nation-state building 
operations in Afghanistan we will be able to verify the thesis research question and 
secondary research questions. If this thesis hypothesis is confirmed, it is important to 
ensure that U.S. nation-state building operations in Afghanistan have met the objectives it 
espoused to achieve during the initial intervention. It is also vital to ensure that any U.S. 
created/developed political, economic, social/cultural, and or security related institutions 
and or systems have a constructive purpose. Having purposefully and important 
institutions and systems will ensure that the nation-state building operations in the 
country are successful. In order to qualify what purposeful and or important nation-state 
building operations entails, we will adopt the following rubric or criteria to judge from:  
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Table 3.2: Nation-State Building Evaluation Rubric 
 
NATION-STATE BUILDING OPERATIONS EVALUATION RUBRIC 
 
 
Political 
Development 
Criteria: 
 
 
Economic 
Development 
Criteria: 
 
 
Social/Cultural 
Development 
Criteria: 
 
 
Security/Military 
Development Criteria: 
 
 
Strong 
decentralized 
government 
institutions in 
various regions 
throughout state. 
 
Structured 
programs to 
gradually reduce 
dependence on 
foreign aid. 
 
Helps reduce and 
eliminate domestic 
violence. 
 
Eliminates corruption in 
the security forces. 
 
Free and fair 
elections. 
 
Improves trade & 
embargo powers. 
 
Works to protect 
children. 
 
Increases local and 
national security forces. 
 
Independent 
judicial system 
with strong  
rule of law. 
 
Eliminates the 
drug trade. 
 
Helps eliminate 
illiteracy. 
 
Training  
and Mentorship 
of national  
security forces. 
 
Checks and 
Balances on 
executive, 
legislative, and 
judicial 
government 
institutions. 
 
Government 
programs aimed 
at the elimination 
of poverty. 
 
Helps increase 
gender equality. 
 
Trained foreign troop 
presence with ability to 
speak native language 
and understand native 
culture. 
 
Freedom of 
religion and press. 
 
National 
reconstruction 
projects. 
 
Helps improve 
women rights. 
 
Security forces spread 
throughout the state. 
 
Provide policy 
focus on 
population and 
their needs. 
 
Demilitarize 
Development 
Assistance.  
 
Government services 
are focused on 
population in both 
rural and urban 
communities. 
 
Security forces strong 
on intelligence gather. 
  
Conditioned aid 
on meaningful 
corruption and 
  
Police lead with 
military in a supporting 
role. 
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governance 
reforms. 
 
References: (Cookman, 2010); (Dobbins, 2003); (Fritz, 2007); (Rubin, 2006); (Shamoo, 
2009); and (Winderl, 1998).  
 
  
This evaluation rubric is composed of several criteria established in the findings 
of several scholarly studies on nation-state building operations and counterinsurgency 
theory. In order to ensure that the most appropriate criteria were adopted for this study, it 
was vital that the selected criteria reflected and aligned to the specific scope of this paper. 
This scope included finding criteria that shows how nation-state building operations 
might assist in the development of a nations political, economic, soial, and security 
related infrastucture and systems. The evaluation rubric found above also reflects other 
findings mentioned in the review of literature chapter.   
 
DATA COLLECTION 
  
An extensive survey was provided to foreign policy experts from numerous 
academic institutions and research think tank organizations. These experts were sent a 
link to the survey and a survey participant informational letter through email. As soon as 
the link button is selected, the participant is taken to Survey Monkey (an on-line survey 
tool used to gather data). Once at Survey Monkey, the survey begins with survey 
directions, and a selection of twenty different questions on U.S. nation-state building 
operations in Afghanistan.  
This survey was designed and seperated into seven section: The Causes, 
Constraints, the Challneges- Political, Economic, Social/Cultural, Security/Military, and 
the Opportunities Sections. The survey contained closed and open ended questions. For 
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eight of the eleven ordinal variable questions, respondents were given an opportunity to 
provide qualitative feedback, if they selected the “other” category. For one of the nine 
nominal variable questions, respondents were given an opportunity to provide qualitative 
feedback, if they selected the “other” category. Finally, there were three open ended 
nominal questions.  
The Causes Section attempts to do the following: engage the respondent’s beliefs 
on why the U.S. and allied forces intervened in Afghanistan; and, to assess why, if any, 
there may be a continued need for international actors in the state. Examples that can be 
selected in the Causes Section include: 9/11/2001, National Security Intelligence, Al 
Qaeda, Private Corporations/Contractors, The Status of Women, and The Drug Trade.  
The Constraints Sections attempts to do the following: provide an analysis of the 
constraints and limitations placed on external actors seeking to intervene in Afghanistan: 
provide an analysis of the constraints and limitations placed on the native Afghan people 
in any attempt to stabilize their country; and, to provide respondents an opportunity to 
respond to their perception of U.S. nation-state building operations in Afghanistan. 
Examples that can be selected in the Constraints Section include: Private military 
contractors, Indigenous Afghanistan Support, Lack of Security Forces, Corruption Within 
Security Forces, Political Corruption, Economic Instability, The Drug Trade, Illiteracy, 
Funding, Strategic Goals and Objectives, and Religious Conflict.  
The Political, Economic, Social/Cultural, and Security/Military Challenges 
Sections were designed to do the following: explore the political challenges confronted 
on current and long-term nation-state building operations, strategies, and objectives; 
assess the economic challenges faced by Afghanistan; analyze the social and cultural 
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challenges in Afghanistan which will affect current and long-term nation-state building 
operations, strategies, and objectives; and assess the many security and military related 
challenges confronted by Afghanistan nation-state building operations, strategies, and 
objectives. Examples that can be selected in these four sections include: Influence of 
Pakistan, Lack of Funding/Resources to Implement Change, Corruption within the 
Executive Branch, The Influence of the Narcotics Industrial Complex, The Impact of 
Strong Poverty Levels, Few National Economic & Financial Institutions, Limited 
Funding Sources, Impact of International Trade Arrangements, High Illiteracy Rates, 
Language/Communication Barriers, Ethnic Conflict among Afghan People, Influence of 
Religious Leaders, Corruption with Foreign Private Military Contractors, Influence of the 
Taliban, Influence on other External Actors, Language/Cultural Barriers with Foreign 
Military & Contractors, Lack of Indigenous Afghanistan, and Civilian Casualty Incidents.  
In the concluding Opportunities Section participants are asked several questions 
that are designed to explore ways in which the U.S. can improve or change its current and 
long-term nation-state building operations, objectives, and strategies in Afghanistan. This 
was done by soliciting open ended questions which will provide this thesis additional 
qualitative data. This data will be used in for the development of thesis recommendations.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
A simple random sample was used to conducting this research. This method was 
selected for a variety of reasons, namely with the goal of recruiting a large random expert 
population into participating in this survey. Many of the participants that would 
participate in a research study, such as this, are extremely busy. This method was one of 
the most efficient procedures that could have been used with the limitations posed on the 
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study. This method also provides for greater opportunities to ensure participant safety as 
compared to other statistical sampling techniques that would require more rigorous and 
complicated procedures that could make ensuring safety more taxing. Out of the one 
hundred and fifty known survey requests for participation and reminders that were sent, 
only thirty survey subjects completed the survey.    
While several attempts have been made to significantly reduce the impact of 
biases that might result in this study, it is inevitable that some bias would occur in the 
study. The author of this research admits to his own bias against a continued military 
presence in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, especially without proper, legitimate, 
benchmarks for success and sustainability. This bias could possibly impact how the 
survey was designed and analyzed. In order reduce the level of bias from data results, 
additional quantitive and qualitative data was used from the colecttion of annual reports, 
media reports, and publicly available sources such as departmental websites. This data 
has been summed, analyzed, and reported in aggregate form and will be the foundational 
basis, which will be displayed, in the Nation-State Building Rebruic Evaluation Criteria.  
 
LIMITATIONS & ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
 
Researching U.S. nation-state building operations in Afghanistan is a complex 
and daunting challenge. Some of the challenges in the process include: ensuring a 
sizeable barometer of policy, academic, military, and developmental expert participation 
in the research study; and, the assumptions that U.S. nation-state building can lead to a 
stable state and eliminate or reduce the influence of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan. In order to effectively answer the research questions, these obstacles have to 
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be addressed in way that either greatly reduces or eliminates the impact of these 
challenges.  
Gathering quantitative data from a large and varied population of U.S. foreign 
policy experts, middle-eastern/Afghanistan experts, military experts, and developmental 
experts would be ideal for any research study such as this. In order to help recruit 
participants in this study, Survey Monkey was used to gather data in a relatively easy 
electronic method. Survey Monkey’s research tool provides additional confidentiality to 
survey participants through its encryption software. However, due to time limitations 
additional obstacles were incurred in the pursuit of attempting to recruit a considerable 
sample. In order to ensure validity in the research data results, this thesis secured a 
restricted number of survey participants from each of the above mentioned backgrounds 
and expertise.  
It is important to note that all data collected from this research is safely secured. 
All electronic data that has been collected has been protected via pass codes and 
passwords that only the author of this research has access to. Once this research is 
complete and my subscription to survey monkey has expired, all electronic data will be 
stored in a firewall proof hard drive and will be in my private research collection that will 
not be accessible to anyone.   
Another limitation to this study is the idea that U.S. nation-state building is the 
only way in which Afghanistan can have a sustainable impact in stabilizing the state and 
eliminating the influence of the Al Qaeda and the Taliban. This thesis acknowledges the 
research indicating how important that nation-state building operations be developed 
without influence, coordination, or intervention by external actors. However, it also 
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recognizes the vast amount of academic literature indicating how external nation-state 
building can partner with and or foster relationships with the native populous to engage in 
nation-state building operations jointly. It analyzed the effectiveness of U.S. operations 
and its relationship and participation of the native Afghan populous in the nation-state 
building operations currently being deployed in Afghanistan.         
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS 
 
 
This thesis addresses the following primary questions: (RQ1) Has U.S. nation-
state building operations in Afghanistan legitimately helped promote or developed the 
political, economic, social, and security related institutions and structures needed to 
stabilize and sustain a united state and eliminate the influence of Al Qaeda and the 
Taliban? Subsequent secondary questions, derives from this include: (RQ2) What are the 
causes for the nation-state building interventions in Afghanistan? (RQ3)What are the 
current constraints on the U.S. and its allies on creating an environment and culture for 
the peoples of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to establish the types of nation-state 
building activities to stabilize their country? What are the current political (RQ4), 
economic (RQ5), social/cultural (RQ6), and security/military (RQ7) related challenges 
the U.S. and its allies are faced with in seeking to create an environment and culture for 
the peoples of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to establish the types of nation-state 
building activities to stabilize their country? This work also attempts to get a barometer 
of the possible opportunities to improve or address certain U.S. nation-state building 
operations (OP1).  
Additionally, it attempts to determine, from data collected in this research study, 
if the research hypothesis is confirmed.  By separating the survey questions into seven 
sections, this thesis aimed to provide data results in a more focused manner. Data 
collected from six of the seven sections will then be assessed using the Nation-State 
Building Evaluation Rubric. The below responses represent the findings of this thesis: 
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ANALYSIS 
 
PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
 In order to answer the primary research question, (RQ1), a series of questions 
were designed to help provide respondents the opportunity to help identify, assess, and 
evaluate the perception of the efficacy of U.S. nation-state building operations in 
Afghanistan. The first of these questions included asking respondents the following 
question: identify if they had a favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or 
very unfavorable opinion of the nation-state building activities in Afghanistan? The 
results include: 37.5%, held an unfavorable opinion; 31.3% held a somewhat unfavorable 
opinion; 18.8% of respondents held a somewhat favorable opinion; 6.3% held a very 
favorable opinion; and, 6.3% indicated that they did not know.  
 
 These results closely align the second question (RQ2) in this series of questions 
where 46.7% of respondents indicated that they think the state-building and nation-
building activities in Afghanistan have hurt the war on terrorism, while only 13.3% 
indicate that U.S. nation and state-building activities have helped the war on terror. It is 
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important to note that 26.7% of respondents believe that there has been no effect to U.S. 
nation and state-building activities, while 13.3% of the respondents selected the “do not 
know” response.   
Do  yo u think  the  na tio n & s ta te -b uild ing  
a c tiv itie s  in Afg ha nis ta n ha ve  he lp e d  the  
wa r o n te rro rism, o r ha s  it hurt the  wa r o n 
te rro rism?
Helped
Hurt
No Effect
Don’t Know
 
 More importantly, the third question in this series of questions shows that 56.3% 
of respondents find that the U.S., and its allies, have done a poor job in the process of 
failing to take into account the needs and interests of the Afghan people in the rebuilding 
operations in Afghanistan. Only 37.5% of respondents said the U.S. and its allies were 
doing a fair job, while 6.3% did not know. None of the respondents indicated the U.S. 
and its allies were doing an excellent or good job.    
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 One of the interesting results found in the fourth question in this series of 
questions show that 43.8% of respondents believe that the people of Afghanistan will be 
better off once the Taliban and Al Qaeda have largely been removed from power by the 
U.S. and its allies. Only 25% of respondents indicated that the native Afghan people will 
be worse off in the long run, and 31.3% did not know.  
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 This closely aligns with the fifth question, where 68.8% of respondents believe 
the U.S. make the right decision to use military force against the Al Qaeda, while only 
31.3% indicated that the U.S. made the wrong decision.  
On the  sub je ct o f Afg ha nis ta n, d id  the  U.S. ma ke  the  rig ht 
d e c is io n o r the  wro ng  d e c is io n to  use  milita ry  fo rce  a g a inst the  Al 
Qa e d a ?
Right Decision
Wrong Decision
Don’t Know
 
 It is interesting to note that respondents were divided when it came to the use of 
U.S. military force against the Taliban. Respondents indicated by 46.7% the U.S. made 
the right decision, 46.7% selected the wrong decision, while 6.7% did not know.    
Did  the  U.S. ma ke  the  rig ht d e c is io n o r the  wro ng  
d e c is io n to  use  milita ry  fo rce  a g a inst the  T a lib a n?
Right Decision
Wrong Decision
Don’t Know
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THE CAUSES  
 
 In order to answer the second research question (RQ2), survey participants were 
asked the following question: What were the leading factors for the nation-state building 
activities in Afghanistan? Respondents were asked to rank their responses from highest to 
lowest, 1 being the highest and 10 being the lowest. The vast majority, or 58.3% of 
respondents, indicated that the number 1 leading factor for the nation-state building 
activities in Afghanistan were the U.S. attacks on September 11, 2001. The following 
chart illustrates the results from the entire question.  
 
  
It is important to note that 46.2% of respondents selected that their leading factor 
of U.S. nation-state building in Afghanistan was the threat of Al Qaeda. The second 
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leading factor for respondents, at 42.9%, selected the “other” category for their number 1 
reason for U.S. nation-state building, and provided some of the following responses: U.S. 
domestic ideology; the need to attack a state…since it had some proven links with Al 
Qaeda; for national security reasons; and for U.S. nation-security strategic purposes. 
Respondents indicated that the third leading factor, by 33.4%, was U.S. national security 
intelligence. The fourth leading factor selected was military intervention at 27.3%. The 
fifth leading factor selected was the influence of private military corporations and 
contractors at 36.4%. The sixth leading factor selected was the impact of the drug trade at 
36.4%. The seventh leading factor selected was the impact of poverty at 18.2%. The 
eighth and ninth leading factor selected was the status of women in Afghanistan at 
27.3%. The tenth leading factor selected was other at 42.9%.   
 
THE CONSTRAINTS 
  
In order to answer the third research question (RQ2), survey participants were 
asked to answer a series of question. The first of which is, what constraints (limitations) 
are placed on the Afghan government and people in their objective to provide nation-state 
building services, systems, and institutions. This open ended question resulted in some of 
the following responses: corruption; capability and capacity issues; the drug trade; and, 
the absence of an educated population.   
The second question in this series asked respondents what the international 
constraints (limitations) to nation-state building operations in Afghanistan included. This 
open ended question resulted in the some of the following responses: political will; 
funding constraints; lack of international coordination; lack of investment; cultural and 
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language barriers; unrealistic expectations; lack of support from Pakistan; lack of support 
from tribal leaders; and, lake of support and inclusion from and with the Taliban.       
The third question was what challenges or constraints do the U.S. state-building 
intervention efforts in Afghanistan consist of currently. Respondents were asked to rank 
their responses from highest to lowest, 1 being the highest and 12 being the lowest. The 
fast majority or 53.3% of respondents indicated that political corruption as the leading 
challenge to state-building operations in Afghanistan. The second leading factor at 21.4% 
was indigenous Afghan support. The third leading factor at 21.4% was corruption within 
security force. The fourth leading factor at 21.4following table represents the entire 
survey results, including the other results not mentioned above:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 57 
THE CHALLENGES 
 
In order to answer the fourth research question (RQ4), survey participants were 
asked to answer the following question: what are the political challenges to U.S. nation-
state building operations in Afghanistan. Respondents were asked to rank their responses 
from highest to lowest, 1 being the highest and 9 being the lowest. The leading selection 
from respondents, at 50%, was the “other” category where respondents provided the 
following qualitative feedback: the need to build, not simply rebuild basic institutions; 
acceptance by Afghans; war in Iraq dissuades war in Afghan; American officials do not 
have a clue on how to “build” a nation; the influence of tribal warlords; poor 
understanding of Afghanistan.  It is interesting to note that there was a five way tie, or 
15.4% of respondents indicated that the leading political challenges in Afghanistan were 
the following; the influence of Iran; corruption with the judicial and legislative branches; 
provincial/regional political corruption; and religious or ethnic conflict among political 
establishment.  The following chart indicates the entire results provided:  
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 In order to answer the fifth research question (RQ5), survey participants were 
asked to answer the following question: what are the economic challenges to U.S. nation-
state building operations in Afghanistan. Respondents were asked to rank their responses 
from highest to lowest, 1 being the highest and 7 being the lowest. Data indicates that 
37.5% of respondents selected “other” and provided some of the following qualitative 
feedback: insecurity; economic exploitation by other nations; Afghanistan’s marginal 
location in the international capitalist economy; the no alternatives narcotic industry; and 
U.S. economic domination of middle-east natural resources. It is important to note that 
35. 7% of respondents also selected limited funding sources as their number 1 selection. 
The second leading economic challenge, at 43.8%, respondents selected few national 
economic and financial institutions. The third leading economic challenge, at 31.3%, 
respondents indicated the impact of strong poverty levels, while 28.6% of respondents 
selected the impact of high unemployment as Afghanistan’s fourth leading economic 
challenge. The following chart represents the entire results from the stated question.  
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In order to answer the sixth research question (RQ6), survey participants were 
asked to answer the following question: what are the social/cultural challenges to U.S. 
nation-state building operations in Afghanistan. Respondents were asked to rank their 
responses from highest to lowest, 1 being the highest and 8 being the lowest. The 
majority of respondents, at 62.5%, selected “other” which provided some of the 
following qualitative responses: history of disunity; ideology of the Pashtun people; poor 
understanding of what is possible; limited capacity of the international community to 
understand the complexity of the problems faced; influence of tribal leaders; strong 
cultural traditions; blood feuds; ethnic and religious differences; and, land disputes.  The 
second leading factor selected, at 26.7%, was the influence of external actors. The third 
leading factor selected, at 23.1%, was the influence of religious leaders. The following 
chart represents the entire results from the stated question. 
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In order to answer the seventh research question (RQ7), survey participants were 
asked to answer the following question: what are the security/military challenges to U.S. 
nation-state building operations in Afghanistan? Respondents were asked to rank their 
responses from highest to lowest, 1 being the highest and 11 being the lowest. The 
majority of responses, at 37.5%, selected the influence of the Taliban. It is important to 
know that 26.7% of respondents also selected corruption within the Afghan security 
forces as the number 1 leading security/military challenge. Respondents were split 
between the influence of other external actors and lack of indigenous Afghan security 
forces both at 26.7%. The third leading security challenge selected, at 25%, were the 
civilian casualty incidents. The following chart represents the entire results from the 
stated question.  
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In order to provide a comprehensive assessment on the entire nation-state building 
operations in Afghanistan and to guide possible thesis recommendations, a series of 
questions were asked (OP1). The first of these questions included asking respondents the 
following question: In order to develop a failed or struggling state into a democracy what 
sort of state-building opportunities exist in Afghanistan that countries, like the U.S., 
should attempt to assist, develop, or restructure. Respondents were asked to rank their 
responses from highest to lowest, 1 being the highest and 10 being the lowest. The 
majority of respondents, at 40%, selected free and fair elections, while 33.3% selected 
public education, and 28.6% selected an independent judicial system. The second 
selection leading selection, at 35.7%, was the creation and development of a public health 
system. The third leading selection, at 20%, was freedom of the press, while 30.8% of 
respondents selected capital markets as the fourth leading selection. The following chart 
represents the entire results from the stated question. 
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The second question in this series asking respondents the following question: 
what are the most important nation-building opportunities that exist in Afghanistan? 
Respondents were asked to rank their responses from highest to lowest, 1 being the 
highest and 8 being the lowest. The majority of respondents, at 61.5%, selected literacy 
and education as their leading selection. At 27.3%, child protection was selected as the 
second leading choice, while 25% also selected “other” and provided the following 
qualitative feedback: justice and security are the largest challenges and opportunities; 
developing future leaders; instituting peace education; utilizing local community-school 
committees to support cooperation; and economic development. The third leading 
selection, at 40%, was addressing domestic violence related issues. The fourth leading 
selection, at 33.3% was addressing women’s right issues. The following chart represents 
the entire results from the stated question. 
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The third question in this series asked participants how important is it for the 
nation-state building activities in Afghanistan to be seen by the world as an effort of 
many countries working together, not just a US effort. Respondents were to select very 
important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important. The vast 
majority or 66.7% of respondents indicated very important, while 20% indicated 
somewhat important. Only 6.7% of respondents indicated not too important, while 6.7% 
also did not know.   
 
 
The fourth question in this series asked participants who they think could do the 
best job at helping the Afghanistan people form a stable government—the United States 
and its allies or the United Nations. From the data collected, 37.5% of respondents 
indicated that the U.N. would do the best job, while 37.5% also said both the U.S. and its 
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allies including the U.N. would be best to work together. It is important to note that 
31.3% of respondents selected “other” where they provided some of the following 
qualitative feedback: Nation-state building from outside, always results into a fragile state 
and a civil society disconnected from that artificial state; externalized nation-state 
building gives birth to a "fictive state", or what we could call a "floating state" because it 
has no solid anchor inside the civil society, therefore no internal legitimacy; regional 
powers have to be involved, including the Taliban; and, the need for greater collaboration 
and involvement from other regional players including Iran, Pakistan, and India. The 
following chart represents the entire results from the stated question. 
 
 
The final question in this series asked participants to list and explain any changes 
they would make in the US-Afghanistan strategy that would ensure (more) success in its 
 65 
nation-state building operations in Afghanistan. Respondents provided some of the 
following excerpted qualitative responses to this open ended question:  
 Fight corruption inside the Afghan government, but the paradox today is that the 
US has to rely on the corrupted Karzai government.  
 
 You can't do serious "nation/state building" by relying on a corrupted and 
decredibilized local government.  
 
 Coordinate the donors and aid activities in the Afghan provinces. 
 
 Energize a regional approach seeking to involve Pakistan, India, Iran, and even 
Russia and China in creating a stable Afghanistan Design a study abroad for 
10,000 Afghan’s per year.  
 
 Utilize a multi-nation approach, so it doesn't appear to be an "occupation".  
 
 Find a plan to eradicate illegal opium production, by a top-down approach, 
beginning with the drug lords rather than by decimating crops on small farms.  
 
 Build major infrastructure (roads & rail) across the country to mobilize citizens 
and to encourage more industrial sectors. 
 
 Reduce open ended nature of U.S. commitment, which will give leverage over 
government. 
 
 Empower, to the extent possible, local elites. 
 
 Subscribe to Colin Powell's Pottery Barn rule: you break it, you own it.   
 
 
HAS THERE BEEN AN IMPACT/RUBRIC RESULTS 
 
From the general qualitative data collected during the literature review, we can 
determine that there has been nation-state building activities that have helped create 
institutions and systems to help stabilize Afghanistan and reduce, to some extent, the 
influence of external groups such as Al Qaeda. However, this does not mean that the 
hypothesis is confirmed. It only means that additional quantitative and qualitative 
analysis must be performed in order to assess if any of the nation-state building 
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operations have actually made an impact in the state, that U.S. efforts are sustainable, and 
that activities are in the best interest of the Afghan people. If the analysis determines that 
U.S. nation-state building operations are sustainable and in the best interest if the Afghan 
people we can conclude that the thesis hypothesis is falsified. If the analysis determines 
that U.S. nation-state building operations are not sustainable and not in the best interest of 
the Afghan people, we can conclude the thesis hypothesis valid.   
The quantitative and qualitative data provided by the thesis survey responses and 
from other published studies, were measured by the evaluation rubric chart, which was 
established in the methodology chapter. Once an analysis of the survey responses were 
made and measured against the rubric criteria, this thesis was able to determine if U.S. 
nation-state building operations are sustainable and in the best interest of the Afghan 
people. The below chart reflects the findings of this thesis.   
Table 4.1: Nation-State Building Operations Evaluation Rubric Results 
 
NATION-STATE BUILDING OPERATIONS 
EVALUATION RUBRIC RESULTS 
 
  
Political 
Development 
Criteria: 
 
 
Economic 
Development 
Criteria: 
 
 
Social/Cultural 
Development 
Criteria: 
 
 
Security/Military 
Development 
Criteria: 
 
 Strong 
decentralized 
government 
institutions in 
various regions 
throughout state. 
Structured 
programs to 
gradually reduce 
dependence on 
foreign aid. 
Helps reduce and 
eliminate domestic 
violence. 
Eliminates corruption in 
the security forces. 
 
THESIS 
FINDINGS 
Since the 
intervention, 
little progress 
has been made.  
Both survey 
respondents and 
recent published 
studies on 
Afghanistan 
Extensive 
evidence exists 
indicating that 
very little, if any, 
progress has 
been made in 
attempting to 
reduce the level 
of foreign aid in 
There is little 
evidence showing 
any reduction of 
domestic violence 
in Afghanistan. 
However, there has 
been foreign aid 
that has been 
directed to NGO’s 
Both survey results 
and additional 
research data indicate 
that the U.S. has not 
been effective in 
reducing or 
eliminating the gross 
corruption within the 
Afghan security 
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indicate that 
Afghanistan’s 
government is 
largely 
centralized and 
that it is not 
effective in 
delivering key 
services to the 
Afghan people 
outside of Kabul 
and other 
regions where 
U.S. or allied 
troops are 
occupying.   
(Jones, 2009) 
Afghanistan. 
Survey results 
also indicate that 
this is a serious 
challenge 
towards 
improving 
Afghanistan’s 
economic future. 
(Fields, 2010)  
to help educate the 
native population 
about the role of 
women and 
problems 
associated with 
domestic violence. 
(Goodhand, 2004) 
forces. The corruption 
within the Afghan 
security forces has 
been documented for 
several years. 
However efforts to 
reduce the level of 
corruption within the 
security forces have 
been hampered for a 
variety of reasons, 
including a lack of 
mentorship, 
legitimacy, illiteracy 
and language barriers.  
(Jones, 2009)   
 Free and fair 
elections. 
Improves trade & 
embargo powers 
Works to protect 
children. 
Increases local and 
national security forces. 
 
THESIS 
FINDINGS 
Research 
indicates that 
many Afghan’s 
do not believe 
that the election 
system in 
Afghanistan is 
credible or 
democratic. 
Survey responses 
also claim recent 
corruption with 
the last 
presidential 
election. (Sinha, 
3009)  
There is 
evidence that 
attempts have 
been made at 
establishing and 
develop 
Afghanistan’s 
trade and 
embargo 
institutions and 
systems. 
However, many 
are concerned of 
the drug trade 
being further 
entangled in 
these systems. 
(Cookman, 2010) 
There is evidence 
that some progress 
has been made at 
attempting to 
educate Afghan 
children through 
the creation of 
schools for both 
boys and girls. 
However, there is 
also evidence that 
many of these 
projects have 
either been stopped 
by war lords or the 
Taliban. Survey 
responses also 
indicate that many 
children in 
Afghanistan are a 
part of an 
underground 
sex/slave trade. 
(Menon,2008) 
Recent research 
indicates that there 
has been an increase of 
local Afghans in the 
Afghan security forces 
for the last several 
years. Survey results 
indicate that there has 
been progress in 
recruiting efforts of 
local Afghan’s into the 
Afghan security force. 
(Johnson, 2010) 
 Independent 
judicial system 
with strong rule 
of law. 
Eliminates the 
drug trade. 
Helps eliminate 
illiteracy. 
Training and 
Mentorship of national 
security forces. 
 
THESIS 
FINDINGS 
Extensive 
research 
indicates that the 
Afghan judicial 
system and rule 
of law are highly 
compromised by 
pressure and 
influence of the 
Recent evidence 
indicates that 
U.S. operations 
working to 
reduce the drug 
trade have been 
hampered by 
security issues, 
particularly in 
Although evidence 
exists that 
international 
agencies, such as 
the USAID, have 
attempted to 
reduce the 
illiteracy among 
many communities 
There is research that 
indicates that the U.S. 
has spent millions of 
dollars in training and 
mentoring the Afghan 
security forces. 
However, there is also 
evidence that the 
efficacy of this 
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executive 
branch, 
corruption 
within the legal 
community, and 
external 
influence of the 
Taliban and 
tribal war lords. 
(Sinha, 2009) 
areas with a 
weak 
international 
troop presence. 
Survey results 
also indicate that 
the drug trade 
continues to be a 
large source of 
the economic 
growth of the 
Afghanistan 
state and that 
the narcotics 
industry is being 
supported by 
many within the 
Karzai 
administration. 
(Johnson, 2010) 
in Afghanistan, 
results of these 
efforts have not 
been proven 
effective. Survey 
results also indicate 
that illiteracy rates 
continue to impact 
other nation-state 
building operations 
such as the training 
of local Afghan’s 
into the Afghan 
security forces.  
(Johnson, 2010) 
training and 
mentoring is 
questionable due to 
continued corruption 
charges, a lack of 
preparedness of troops 
to go into the field, and 
a lack of disciple 
among security forces. 
Survey responses also 
indicate that the 
training component to 
U.S. 
counterinsurgency 
operations must be 
redesigned to ensure 
greater efficacy. 
(Jones, 2009) 
 Checks and 
Balances on 
executive, 
legislative, and 
judicial 
government 
institutions. 
Government 
programs aimed 
at the elimination 
of poverty. 
Helps increase 
gender equality. 
Trained foreign troop 
presence with ability to 
speak native language 
and understand native 
culture. 
 
THESIS 
FINDINGS 
Extensive 
evidence exists 
detailing the lack 
of checks in 
balance within 
the Afghanistan 
constitution and 
the day-to-day 
operations of the 
state 
government. 
Currently the 
executive branch 
has the power to 
appoint without 
the consent of 
the legislative 
branch 
thousands of 
senior and 
career level 
officials, in all 
three branches 
of government. 
The executive 
branch has also 
budgetary 
authority not 
typically given in 
There is 
evidence that 
several attempts 
at eliminating 
poverty through 
the creation of 
jobs have been 
made. 
Thousands of 
Afghan’s have 
been hired for 
governmental 
jobs. However, 
the funds to pay 
for these jobs are 
based on foreign 
aid that might 
not be sustained 
within the 
coming years. 
Survey responses 
indicate that 
poverty is still 
one of the largest 
problems facing 
Afghanistan and 
that efforts to 
target 
communities 
There is little 
evidence showing 
any improvements 
to gender equality 
in Afghanistan. 
However, there has 
been foreign aid 
that has been 
directed to NGO’s 
to help educate the 
native population 
about the role of 
women, men, and 
children in 
democratic 
societies.  
(Goodhand, 2004) 
Evidence exists that 
there are foreign 
troops from certain 
countries that have 
been trained on the 
Afghan culture and 
language. Evidence 
also exists that other 
foreign troops did not 
have a rigorous 
training of the Afghan 
language and culture. 
Survey responses also 
indicate that training 
of foreign troops on 
the Afghan people and 
language should be 
further provided and 
supported for existing 
and new troops to the 
state. (Jones, 2008) 
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a democratic 
government 
system. Survey 
results also 
indicate s that 
this imbalance 
greatly impacts 
the legitimacy of 
U.S. efforts and 
the sustainability 
of its nation-
state building 
operations. 
(Cookman, 2010) 
outside of Kabul 
have been futile.  
(Sinha, 2009)  
 Freedom of 
religion and press. 
National 
reconstruction 
projects. 
Helps improve 
women rights. 
Security forces spread 
throughout the state. 
 
THESIS 
FINDINGS 
Afghanistan’s 
state religion is 
Islam. There are 
several different 
forms of Islam in 
Afghanistan. 
Many 
communities 
around 
Afghanistan are 
structured so 
that homogenous 
religious groups 
live among 
themselves.   
Afghanistan also 
does not have an 
effective and free 
press due to a 
lack of structure, 
corruption, and 
security 
concerns 
imposed on the 
media. 
(CIA,2010) 
A moderate 
number of 
respondents 
indicated slow 
and limited 
progress being 
made to create 
or develop 
Afghanistan’s 
infrastructure. 
Additional 
research 
indicates that 
current 
reconstruction 
efforts are highly 
targeted to 
specific 
communities and 
not the 
communities in 
most need.  
(Fields, 2010) 
There is little 
evidence showing 
any improvements 
in women’s rights 
in Afghanistan. 
However, there has 
been foreign aid 
that has been 
directed to NGO’s 
to help educate the 
native population 
about the role of 
women. Survey 
responses also 
indicate that the 
role of women 
should be a 
stronger 
component to 
nation-state 
building 
operations. 
(Goodhand,2004) 
Survey responses do 
indicate that U.S. and 
coalition troops are 
spread throughout the 
state. However, 
research indicates that 
the vast majority of 
thee troops are around 
the 
Afghanistan/Pakistan 
borders. (Jones, 2008) 
 Provide policy 
focus on 
population and 
their needs. 
Demilitarize 
Development 
Assistance 
Government 
services are focused 
on population in 
both rural and urban 
communities. 
Security forces strong 
on intelligence gather. 
 
THESIS 
FINDINGS 
Recent research 
has indicated 
that attempts at 
focusing 
governmental 
services to the 
general 
population and 
There is ample 
evidence that the 
U.S. funds and 
supports several 
armed war lords 
and other actors 
outside of the 
government 
Recent research 
indicates that there 
have been ample 
resources used to 
support the lives of 
Afghan’s in rural 
and urban 
communities. 
Recent evidence does 
indicate that the U.S. 
has been successful in 
increasing the 
effectiveness of 
intelligence gathering 
with the support of the 
Afghan security 
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their needs have 
not been 
effective. Many 
different tribal 
communities 
have not been 
involved in the 
decision making 
process of 
governmental 
allocation of 
resources and 
services. Survey 
results also 
indicate that this 
is a concern to 
the sustained 
progress of 
nation-state 
building 
operations in the 
future. (Sinha, 
2009) 
within various 
communities 
around 
Afghanistan in 
order to provide 
services to the 
tribal Afghan 
communities. 
This 
delegitimizes the 
Afghan 
government and 
helps sustain 
actors in which 
we are trying to 
eliminate. 
(Cookman, 2010) 
However, due to 
tribal war lords 
and other security 
concerns these 
resources have not 
been effective, 
utilized, or 
provided to many 
in these 
communities. 
(Sinha, 2009)  
forces. (Jones, 2008)  
  Conditioned aid 
on meaningful 
corruption and 
governance 
reforms 
 Police lead with 
military in a supporting 
role. 
 
THESIS 
FINDINGS 
 Evidence exists 
that many in the 
international 
community 
including leading 
coalition 
partners, 
NGO’s, and 
other financial 
institutions are 
seeking to 
reform the 
foreign aid given 
to Afghanistan 
so that it is 
condition based 
with clear 
timeframes and 
objectives. 
(Cookman, 2010)  
 There is evidence that 
the Afghan security 
forces are still largely 
military related, and 
that the U.S. and 
coalition partners have 
not been successful in 
establishing a viable 
and effective police 
force throughout 
Afghanistan due to 
tribal war lords, and 
other internal and 
external actors that 
have more influence 
and legitimacy to the 
Afghan people than 
the U.S. trained 
Afghan police force. 
(Jones, 2008)  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
The overall goal of this thesis was to explore and test the efficacy of U.S. nation-
state building operations in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. This included an 
analysis of the political, economic, social/cultural, and security/military related 
institutions and systems created or developed by the U.S. and its coalition partners. My 
hypothesis is that U.S. nation-state building operations in Afghanistan have not made 
legitimate progress in helping to promote or develop the types of institutions and 
structures needed to stabilize the state or reduce the influence of the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda. Responses from this study, along with recent qualitative and quantitative data on 
Afghanistan, indicate that U.S. nation-state building operations have not been that 
successful in helping to stabilize the state or reduce the influence of extremist or external 
actors such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Although responses highlight several positive 
initiatives and projects U.S. nation-state operations have made, these impacts are not that 
sustainable or legitimate to the Afghan people. Further research on this issue should be 
conducted in the future.   
 
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE LITERATURE REVIEW & DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The most vital lesson from the literature review is that nation-state building 
operations should be a comprehensive process. Nation-state building operations that are 
not balanced, or rely too heavily on one component of nation-state building while 
neglecting other components, damages the possible sustained success one might achieve 
in attempting to stabilize a state. The U.S. government has spent hundreds of millions of 
dollars trying to build the Afghan security forces. It has also spent ample resources 
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working to eliminate Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The U.S., however, has not spent 
adequate resources supporting the development/nation-state building operations needed 
in order to address systemic and structural issues that allow and support these type of 
extremist groups to have the type of influence they have in Afghanistan and in the region. 
The U.S. nation-state building political, economic, and social/cultural operations should 
have been a priority, along with security development, during the immediate aftermath of 
the 2001 military intervention in Afghanistan and the fall of the Taliban. Due to the U.S. 
largely focusing on security/military development, its efforts to stabilize a country with 
one of the highest poverty, illiteracy, and child mortality levels in the world, will greatly 
suffer.      
The findings of this study suggest that the U.S. government should seek a new 
strategy in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The current strategy of focusing largely 
on security/military development is not working. Both the literature review and the 
survey results indicate the many issues in maintaining the status quo. Research has shown 
that Al Qaeda has relocated and is in many regions throughout Pakistan and the Middle-
East, and the Taliban have re-emerged all throughout Afghanistan. The research findings 
also indicate that hundreds of current Afghan security forces were former members of the 
Taliban, are related to members of the Taliban, and or are greatly fearful of what the 
Taliban will do once external forces leave Afghanistan. Research also indicates that a 
large percentage of Afghan security forces are corrupt. This corruption within the Afghan 
security forces limits the legitimacy the U.S. is trying to create and sustain among the 
native Afghan people. It is also important to note from the research collected that the 
civilian casualty incident rates, caused by U.S. and allied troops, have greatly increased 
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the recruitment of Afghan people to subscribe to terrorism or joining the Taliban or some 
other extremist group. It is important to note that a majority of participants in the research 
survey indicated that the U.S. made the right decision in intervening in Afghanistan after 
the attacks on September 11, 2001.  
 The findings of this research study align with the findings in the literature review. 
Both indicate that any new strategy that the U.S. might adopt in Afghanistan should 
include an increased emphasis on the other components of nation-state building 
operations, namely, political, economic, and social/cultural development. Many 
throughout the body politic indicate that the U.S. and its allies have failed to take into 
account the needs of the Afghan people and have failed to successfully incorporate 
security and developmental services to many regions throughout Afghanistan, and not 
just in Kabul.  
One of the most pressing nation-state building operations that should be 
conducted is political development. There are a variety of reasons why the nation’s 
political institutions and systems need further development. Concerns over the 
incompetence and corruption with the Karzai administration have frequented this 
research study. However, research shows that in order to leave sustained nation-state 
building successful projects, including security development, it is vital that a nation-states 
political institutions and systems be developed in a way that is transparent, has legitimacy 
with internal and external actors, and that these institutions work for the greater good of 
the people in which they are to serve. The findings of this research indicate that the 
political challenges to U.S. nation-state building operations in Afghanistan are largely 
based on the power, structure, and selection of the various branches within Afghanistan’s 
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federal government and the influence of external forces that have great influence on the 
success and or failure of the state. The research shows the limited ability for the U.S. 
operations to succeed with the limited checks and balances within the executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches of government. Currently the constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan gives President Karzai the ability to appoint over 1,000 cabinet 
and senior leaders throughout the Afghan government and its different branches of 
government. Many of the individuals selected by President Karzai are known war lords, 
drug profiteers, and other corrupt Taliban associated leaders, such as his own brother.  
Eliminating the political corruption in Afghanistan should be a priority of the U.S. 
government and the Afghan people. The findings from this study indicate that the 
constraints or limitations placed on the Afghan government attempting to provide public 
services to the Afghan people will be greatly impacted by the rapid corruption throughout 
all governmental entities including the executive, legislative, judicial branches and the 
military/security forces. Recent research findings have uncovered hundreds of corruption 
cases that are of concern to the international community (Greenwald, 2009). Many of 
which, the U.S. government has refused to acknowledge and address when speaking of 
the Karzai administration and the nation-state building or counterinsurgency operations 
currently being conducted with the collaboration and coordination of the Karzai 
administration. In order to provide greater legitimacy to U.S. efforts among the Afghan 
people, the U.S. and its allies should work to these issues.     
   Another important aspect that the U.S. and its allies should work to improve is the 
economic situation among the Afghan people and state. How can the U.S. government 
expect to stabilize a state when the majority of the people are unemployed, 
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underemployed, and do not have basic access to human services? The U.S. and its allies 
must become serious with working to reduce the ramped poverty in this state. If they do 
not become serious, attempts at securing Afghanistan from the influence of the Taliban 
will not be successful. It is important to note that the findings of this research study 
indicate that the economic challenge to U.S. nation-state building operations in 
Afghanistan are largely impacted by non-sustainable development aid to Afghanistan and 
the lack of effective governmental institutions that manage and oversee the states 
economic objectives. The research indicates that the vast majority of all governmental 
spending for security and domestic programs is based on the aid from the developing 
world and other lending agencies such as the U.N. and the IMF. This funding is 
unsustainable, especially in a world economic recession.  
The U.S. should work with other NGO’s and coalition partners to help establish 
credible economic institutions that can help develop the type of revenue generating 
capabilities and trade facilitation operations needed that all developed countries have. It 
is interesting to note that the research findings also highlight the great impact the 
narcotics industry has on the states economic objectives, including the millions of people 
who make their living off of the trade, and the lives it damaged in Afghanistan and 
throughout the world. The findings also explain the challenge the government has when 
trying to improve the nation’s historically high poverty and unemployment levels.  
Finally, it seems that the nation-state building operations in Afghanistan have 
almost neglected working to develop the states social/cultural needs. Working to improve 
the social and cultural challenges in Afghanistan would support the U.S. political, 
economic, and security development nation-state building attempts. The findings of the 
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research study on the social/cultural challenges to U.S. nation-state building operations in 
Afghanistan illuminate a number of important issues. The findings highlight the faulty 
education system and skyrocketing illiteracy rates. High illiteracy rates have continued to 
impact the training of native troop forces, how external forces have communicated with 
the Afghan people, and the projects that are designed to incorporate and support the 
services provided to the Afghan people.  
The research also indicates how the deleterious education system in Afghanistan 
has greatly impacted the workforce, the culture, and the religious intolerance in the state. 
The education system has also greatly perpetuated the inequality of the sexes, with 
females not being allowed to get a public education in the vast majority of provinces 
within Afghanistan. The U.S. should work with NGO’s to help address these type of 
issues, not only to advance its own nation-state building objectives, but to also help 
improve the lives of people who have experiences conflict for almost the entire time 
Afghanistan has been recognized as a state.     
RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
Based on the quantitative and qualitative analysis established from this research 
study, a number of recommendations designed to stabilize the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan and eliminate and or reduce the influence of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan are possible. These recommendations would be beneficial to U.S. national-
security and foreign policy apparatus and for academic researchers for continued 
investigation.   
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Recommendation 1: 
Establish A Afghanistan Nation-State Building Strategic Plan 
  
  
One of the weaknesses of both the Bush & Obama administration’s foreign policy 
approach to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is the lack of a comprehensive nation-
state building strategic plan. This plan should include the vision of where the U.S., the 
international community, and the people of Afghanistan, would like to take their country 
and what they want to look like as a developing nation. This plan should include the 
mission of all stakeholder efforts in Afghanistan. This mission statement should help 
clarify the role of the U.S. is in Afghanistan, the role of the international community in 
Afghanistan, and the role of the Afghan people, all of which should be working to 
achieve the plans vision statement. The plan should include the goals of each of the three 
different groups (i.e. The U.S., International Community, the Afghan People), and the 
values of the three different groups. The plan would also incorporate a plan for 
implementation that will take into account the costs and human leadership required for 
such implementation. After the plan has been drafted, it should be used as a road guide to 
advance the desires and interests of the Afghan people, and as a way to communicate 
U.S. objectives in the region.    
 
Recommendation 2: 
Establish Conditions Based Funding Measures  
 
  
The U.S. should work with international organizations and allied countries to 
develop a process in which all external funding that goes to the government in Kabul is 
conditions based. Once the nation-state building strategic plan has been formulated it 
should serve as the mechanism in which external actors can measure the progress of the 
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Afghan people and their representatives, to the criteria established in the plan that they, 
the Afghan people and their representatives, helped decide. The criteria established in the 
plan should be balanced due to feedback from all stakeholders. For example, the U.S. 
might want to provide funding to the government in Kabul for security or agriculture 
services, but only if the government in Kabul aligns with the criteria established in the 
strategic plan that says the government in Kabul must reform to ensure more checks and 
balances among the different branches of government. If the government in Kabul does 
not meet that criteria within a certain length of time, the international community can 
withhold their funding or reduce the amount requested until the criteria has been made. It 
is important to note that conditions based aid has limitations, but maintaining the status 
quo is not sustainable nor is it having the type of positive impact the Afghan people can 
witness.  
 
Recommendation 3: 
Reduce Dependency on Karzai Administration & Invest In Afghan People 
 
  
The U.S. government should reduce their dependence on the Karzai 
administration and invest more resources directly to the Afghan people. The vast majority 
of the Afghan people have conflicting view points about President Karzai. Since 
President Karzai came to power, with the support of the U.S. government, the world 
community has learned, repeatedly, of the invested corruption in his government. His 
government’s corruption and our lack of a clear strategy and plan further delegitimize 
U.S. nation-state building efforts. In order to address this issue, it is imperative for the 
U.S. to spend more time and resources working to improve basic human needs of the 
Afghan people. This can be incorporated into the national strategic plan addressed in 
 79 
Recommendation 1, but additional efforts from external actors such as the U.S. and the 
U.N. should go into providing basic needs such as food, shelter, and health care to the 
Afghan people. By showing the Afghan people these positive traits, opportunities to 
delegitimize the Taliban can be strengthened.  
 
Recommendation 4: 
Reduce Civilian Casualties by 100% 
  
  
The U.S. and its allies need to invest in a new counterinsurgency strategy. The 
leadership that designed and advocated the current strategy is found to be grossly 
incompetent. Since the initial military intervention in Afghanistan, over 1,000 U.S. troops 
and over 20,000 Afghan civilians have been killed. In the last four years, the insurgence 
has increased their violence, and war lords have taken over many provinces and tribal 
governments outside of Kabul. Although the planning for the war after the defeat of the 
Taliban was faulty and under-resourced, the U.S. has essentially maintained the same 
failed strategy it established during the second term of the Bush administration. One issue 
that continues to advance sympathy to the Taliban and extremist groups is the high civil 
casualty rates brought on by U.S. and coalition forces. The goal of the U.S. should be to 
reduce civilian casualty rates by 100% within a small set schedule, by redesigning its 
counterinsurgency plans and conducting the types of nation-state building operations that 
align with the strategic plan as mentioned in Recommendation 1 U.S. forces should be 
able to accomplish this goal within a set period of time.  
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THE CHARGE 
 
 In order to achieve the above stated goals, the U.S. must research the history of 
Afghanistan and its people, analyze the success and failures of U.S. actions since its 
military intervention in 2001, and thoroughly investigate and designate the costs 
associated with U.S. nation-state building operations it is willing and capable of 
providing. Otherwise, the U.S. will continue to spend billions of dollars in an effort that 
many consider to be futile.  This thesis sought to investigate the efficacy of U.S. nation-
state building operation's in Afghanistan in order to determine if it has helped create or 
developed the institutions and systems needed for that country to stabilize and eliminate 
the influence of the Taliban & Al Qaeda. Although the thesis hypothesis was confirmed, 
opportunities to improve the lives of the Afghan people still exist. The recommendations 
provided in this thesis are designed to provide another perspective the U.S. government 
and its coalition partners should consider when attempting to conduct its nation-state 
building operations in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.    
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